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But public pension funding levels have fallen precari-
ously low in some cases. The financial crisis carved a 25 per-
cent dent in the median plan’s assets in 2008. In better
times, investment returns can cover three-quarters of a pub-
lic pension plan’s costs for the year (employee and employer
contributions make up the rest). Poor asset performance 
has drawn attention to worsening funding positions of the
plans over the last two recessions. 
Funding levels always fluctuate with the business cycle.
But many commentators say the problems are different this
time: The recent recession was the second major market
decline in a single decade, and now underfunding is both
severe and pervasive across plans. The worst projections sug-
gest plans will start running out of money in less than a
decade. Since states are required to balance their budgets
each year, that means any shortfalls may be covered by 
taxpayers.
In aggregate, public pensions were about 84 percent
funded in fiscal year 2008 (the last year for which a compre-
hensive estimate is available), according to a recent report 
by the Pew Center on the States, a Washington, D.C.-based
think tank that studies state issues. That’s a gap of 
$452 billion. 
And pensions aren’t the only public obligation coming
due. Adding in promised health care and other nonpension
benefits for retirees makes the shortfalls look even larger.
The Pew Center estimates there are $587 billion of these lia-
bilities outstanding, with less than 5 percent of them funded
as of fiscal year 2008. Only two states, Alaska and Arizona,
had funded more than half of health and other nonpension
benefit liabilities. This is largely because states were not
required by official accounting standards to acknowledge
and report the liabilities until 2006. Many funded them on a
pay-as-you-go basis until just recently, so they’re in the
process of catching up on funding. Still, combining the
unfunded liabilities of public pensions and other public
worker retirement benefits yields a gap of about $1 trillion.
That roughly equals states’ total outstanding bond debt as of
2008, and almost one-third of the Pew Center’s estimate of
total retirement liabilities.
Looking at pensions alone, Illinois is in the worst shape,
with assets equaling just 54 percent of liabilities, followed by
Kansas (59 percent) and Oklahoma (61 percent). Half the
states’ plans were fully funded as recently as 2000. By 2008
only four states met that bar. The Federal Reserve’s Fifth



























bout 7.7 million retirees in the United States currently receive benefits from
public-sector pension plans. Another 19 million workers will one day be added
to the recipient list. They work or have worked for states, municipalities, police
forces, and schools. Public pensions hold more than $3 trillion in assets, and disbursed
more than $175 billion in benefits to retirees in fiscal year 2008 — nearly $23,000 a year
for each of those current retirees, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. spectrum (see chart page 17). North Carolina is in good
shape at 99 percent; only four states nationally were better
funded in 2008. In contrast, only six states were performing
worse than West Virginia. It was funded at 64 percent.
Before the recession the state was on a track toward
improvement, in part by having made large annual contribu-
tions over the last decade.
Sizing the shortfalls is not easy. The asset side of the
equation is skewed by “smoothing” investment gains or 
losses, usually over five years, to get a better sense of trend
performance. Though this is standard accounting practice, it
makes both exceptional and dismal years, like recent ones,
look moderate. West Virginia is one of three states that
doesn’t smooth at all, so on paper it took a larger hit than
most in 2008, partially explaining its poor performance. But
for the other 47 states, smoothing means the gap is likely 
to appear larger once reports on fiscal year 2009 begin to
trickle out, says Kil Huh, Pew Center research director and
one author of its recent report. As recent bad years replace
more distant good years in the smoothing sample, funding
levels will look worse.
Meanwhile, estimating the true size of liabilities is not
straightforward. That requires translating tomorrow’s bene-
fit obligations into today’s dollars, a practice called
discounting. A small change in the discount rate can cause
huge swings in how large liabilities appear, so the choice of
rate is important — and quite controversial. Many econo-
mists say public pensions currently use assumptions that are
much too optimistic, which understates liabilities and
encourages plans to set aside less money today. 
It is not necessarily troublesome if a plan is underfunded;
it’s a matter of degree. “A plan that’s funded at 40 percent
probably has an underfunding problem. Aplan that’s funded
at 80 percent is not necessarily in as bad a condition,” says
Keith Brainard of the National  Association of State
Retirement Administrators, whose members are public 
pension sponsors. “The more important factor is whether
the pension plan is causing fiscal stress for the plan’s sponsor,
the employer: the state, the school district, the city.”
That’s the feared outcome. Everyone is in agreement:
Even if plans were to run out of money, pension benefits will
be paid one way or another. That means either taxes must be
raised or other government services reduced, both of which
would be painful and would almost certainly harm local
economies. 
Making the ARC
There are more than 2,500 public pension systems in the
United States according to the Census, but the largest 75
plans account for more than 80 percent of assets and partic-
ipants. Some states such as Hawaii and Maine have just one
state-sponsored plan for all state and local government
employees plus “special districts” like utilities, hospitals, and
schools. Other states, like Pennsylvania and Illinois, have
hundreds of independent public plans. In some states the
localities pay as much as three-quarters of the total contri-
butions to state-administered plans, but in other states
localities pay for none of them.
The array of structures and political dynamics causes
funding levels to differ widely across plans, but some themes
do emerge. Public pensions “got religion” about funding in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, according to Alicia Munnell
of the Center for Retirement Research (CRR) at Boston
College. Public-sector employment grew in the 1960s and
early 1970s, and a public study on the plans in 1978 brought
some attention to the inconsistent and nontransparent
treatment of their growing liabilities. Then stock market
performance improved, and in 1986 the Governmental
Accounting Standards Board (GASB) created the first stan-
dards for how public pensions should disclose plan assets
and liabilities. As a whole they vastly improved their funding
levels over time. 
For the most part, that means they were diligent about
making the annual required contribution (ARC). The ARC
is the amount a plan sponsor must contribute in a given year,
based on current liabilities and certain assumptions, in order
for it to be fully funded as of some future date (up to 30 years
out, depending on the plan). Experts say a plan consistently
making its ARC payments is one of the most important ways
to keep it healthy, since falling short in one year means more
must be contributed in subsequent years to catch up. 
The stock market boom of the late ’90s helped plans by
beefing up asset performance. Funding looked rosy; some
plans even became overfunded. Many plans succumbed to
pressure to increase benefits or reduce contributions, just as
plans were hit with a rough decade that included the 2001-
2002 market slowdown and the recent financial crisis. That,
combined with growing public awareness of the economic
implications of the aging population, has brought consider-
able public attention to the health of public pensions.
Pension benefits to existing public-sector retirees go up
but rarely go down. In good times public pensions often
increase benefits — some states even have provisions 
whereby any excess returns are automatically devoted to
increasing benefits — while in bad times many simply fail to
make the full ARC payments. The vast majority of public
pensions are defined benefit plans, in which the amount of
benefits is guaranteed (versus defined contribution plans,
where benefits are accrued based on how contributions per-
form once invested). In almost all states, public pensions are
legally restricted from cutting benefits that have already
accrued from past years of work. States that have tried face
lawsuits, most notably the ongoing cases against the state
pensions of Colorado, South Dakota, and Minnesota, which
attempted to reduce cost of living adjustments (COLAs)
already promised to existing and future retirees. 
Public pensions have time and again been regarded by
courts as a constitutionally protected contract between
states and employees. In the face of severe fiscal crises, 
New York City in the 1970s and Orange County, Calif., in the
1990s both cut jobs, reduced services, and imposed losses on
bondholders. Orange County even declared bankruptcy. 
Region Focus | Third Quarter | 2010  15Yet neither failed to make full pension payments because the
legal status of benefits is so well established. 
This is true in the private sector as well, says Andrew
Biggs of the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington,
D.C.-based think tank. In general, accrued benefits are pro-
tected under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA). But private employers have proven more willing to
cut future benefits in bad years — raising the retirement age,
suspending 401(k) matching for a period (private retirement
plans are more likely to operate under a defined contribu-
tion framework), or changing benefit accrual rates. “I think
that would be a better way of doing it in the sense that if
your alternative is firing 10,000 teachers, you would instead
scale down wages, scale down pension contributions,” he
says. “It’s a badly designed thing but there’s a variety of 
reasons it stays that way.” 
The Discounting Debate
How bad is underfunding? That centers on the question of
whether tomorrow’s liabilities are being accurately measured. 
Pension boards and policymakers base funding and bene-
fit decisions in large part on the guidance of actuaries, who in
turn look to the GASB. Its rules say future pension liabilities
should be discounted using the plan’s expected rate of return
on assets. Plans on average assume about an 8 percent return.
Is that too optimistic? Accountants and economists tend
to disagree on this issue. Actuaries point out, correctly, that
public pensions have averaged more than 9 percent returns
over the past 25 years. They say this makes their assumptions
both realistic and the truest indication of how much would
have to be put aside today in order to reach tomorrow’s
funding goals.
Economists, on the other hand, would ask how certain
are the future obligations. Can public funds reduce benefits
or otherwise step down from liabilities if funding falls short?
History has proven that they cannot, so pension liabilities
are a “risk-free obligation” in finance parlance. Therefore,
public pensions should measure liabilities as if they were
going to invest all contributions in very safe but relatively
low-yielding assets, such as Treasury bonds. Discounting at a
risk-free rate would reflect the risk of payments from a tax-
payer’s perspective, and accordingly calls for public funds to
set aside more money today. Public pensions could still
invest funds in the same equities and other risky assets that
have historically produced favorable returns on average,
however. Economists argue that discounting is mostly about
measuring the liabilities accurately.
The Pew Center’s estimate of a $452 billion gap in pen-
sion funding takes the GASB-recommended discounting
method as given. An alternative, more pessimistic scenario is
presented by researchers Joshua Rauh and Robert Novy-
Marx of Northwestern University and the University of
Chicago, respectively. They re-estimated the liabilities of
the 116 largest pension plans sponsored by the 50 states
using GASB discounting methods. Those plans had stated
liabilities of $2.98 trillion and assets of $1.94 trillion in 2008.
But by discounting liabilities at a Treasury rate, they find
that liabilities actually exceed $5 trillion, and the funding
gap is greater than $3 trillion — more than $10,000 for every
individual in the United States. Ohio is in the worst shape
under their methodology in terms of its unfunded liabilities
as a percent of tax revenues. The state would need to devote
almost nine years of tax revenue solely to pension funding
simply to catch up to already-made promises. 
An alternative way to assess the seriousness of under-
funding is to estimate when state plans will run out of money
based on current assets and future payments to retirees. In a
study published earlier this year, Rauh assumed that all
future contributions would exactly cancel out any future
additions to liabilities. The result: Seven states would run
out of money by the end of 2020 — even if they do actually
realize 8 percent returns on investments. 
Munnell and her colleagues performed what perhaps may
be thought of as a more charitable exercise. They took into
account that plans could use the contributions of future
workers to fund payments for today’s retirees. That would
hurt the long-term funding position of plans, but could
prove useful in a funding pinch. Their analysis, too, shows
many plans running out of money in the next couple of
decades. But it pushes the date of insolvency out far enough,
arguably, for plans to improve funding levels and realize an
improvement in asset performance. In other words, the best
guess about when the day of reckoning will arrive depends
crucially on one’s assumptions.
When private pensions ran into underfunding problems
in the 1980s, the federal government responded by recogniz-
ing that many fund sponsors did not have the wherewithal to
increase contributions when the return on equities fell short
of expectations, writes Munnell with CRR colleagues
Richard Kopcke, Jean-Pierre Aubry, and Laura Quinby. 
The private pension insolvencies placed enormous strain on
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which
insures a fraction of private pensions. The solution drawn by
the government for the private sector was to establish 
minimum contribution standards anchored by more conser-
vative assumptions about the returns fund managers would
earn over time on pension assets.
But administrators of public funds argue their plans are
different. Corporations could go bankrupt at any time, leav-
ing the PBGC footing the bill, and therefore are required to
maintain a much shorter, more conservative focus, Brainard
says. This differs from the “going concern” nature of public
employers, especially of the largest plans, which are state-
sponsored and not likely to go bankrupt any time soon. “As a
result it’s more reasonable for these entities to keep a longer
term focus, to invest on a longer term basis.” That’s why 
public plans are allowed to stretch their target for full fund-
ing over 20 or 30 years. “There’s no compelling reason at 
any point that a public pension plan should necessarily be
fully funded.”
But some caution is warranted because of who bears the
risk in the event that a fund runs out of money, Biggs says.
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not the corporation that bears it; it’s passed on to the share-
holders or the employees,” says Biggs. Similarly, if the
government comes up short on pension payments, it’s not
actually the government that bears the burden. “It’s people
who pay taxes to the government, people who would be
employees of the government, or other beneficiaries of the
government. It’s the stakeholders.” 
Passing risk on to subsequent generations is exactly what
the GASB rules intend to avoid. “One of GASB’s main crite-
ria is interperiod equity, that the current crop of taxpayers
should pay for the services they receive,” Brainard says. 
“If we begin to charge for those services as if we’re going to
achieve a risk-free return then we stand a very good chance,
in our view, of overcharging the current crop of taxpayers
and undercharging the future taxpayers,” he says. “You
shouldn’t put it off to the future, but neither should the cur-
rent crop of taxpayers pay for more than they are receiving.” 
These multiple considerations show there are no easy
answers to the discounting question. So the debate rages on
— with little resolution. Munnell says economists and actu-
aries are talking past each other because they’re performing
fundamentally different exercises.
“I think actuaries are in the business of best guesses.
They’re trying to say, ‘Using our best guess, how much
should you have to put aside to fund this plan and to pay off
the unfunded liability? And our best guess is that we’re going
to earn what we’ve earned in the past,’” she says. “And the
economists say, ‘Listen, all I’m interested in is how big are
your liabilities. And if you’re absolutely going to have to pay
them, 100 percent, then they have to be discounted by a rate
that reflects their riskiness.’” 
No Quick Fix
Perhaps the greatest value of conservative discounting
would be to limit the opportunity for reckless behavior.
Munnell refers to CalPERS, the California public employee
pension system, and the largest public pension fund in the
nation. Funding in the late 1990s exceeded 110 percent using
the expected return on assets. Times looked so good that it
dramatically increased benefits, she says, and the state is still
paying for that today. Using a risk-free discount rate, the plan
would have appeared only 76 percent funded at the time.
History has proven that it matters how big liabilities appear.
But for now, policymakers’ hands are tied, Munnell says.
Suppose the pensions utilize 5 percent discounting as finan-
cial economists suggest. Then what? Liabilities would look
larger, and therefore so would the ARC payments that would
keep a given plan funded. But in reality there’s still not that
much public pensions can do in the short term to improve
their position. It would be difficult to increase contributions
when state and local governments are struggling through 
fiscal woes and depressed economies. They can’t reduce 
benefits for existing retirees, as legal precedent has thus far
proven. 
Benefits can be reduced for future workers but the poten-
tially significant cost associated with that is to render public
sponsors less competitive as employers. So keeping pensions
healthy is not the only factor public entities are dealing with,
Brainard says. “It’s also the risk of being able to ensure that
we have the resources necessary to provide public services:
Schools are taught, streets are policed, fires are fought.”
At any rate, that wouldn’t help their finances until years
to come. “It’s like turning a major tank ship in the sea,” says
Huh of the Pew Center. “You make these small adjustments
and you get on a different path. That’s basically what we’re
seeing with the pension system.” For example, about 20
years ago Minnesota increased its retirement age for new
employees, from 65 to 66. “But now 70 percent of the work
force is covered by that one year change. It has managed to
save the state about $650 million.”
In the end, it may be a waiting game. Improving funding
levels will depend largely on a recovering economy and
financial market. It remains to be seen whether the current
focus on public pension health will hold when the economy
recovers.  RF
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